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Recent Decisions
TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AcT-Feres DOCTRINE-POST-DISCHARGE FAILURE To WARN THEORY-The Third Circuit Court of

Appeals has held that a Federal Tort Claims Act claim based on
the government's post-discharge failure to warn a veteran of the
hazards of radiation exposure is barred pursuant to the Supreme

Court's holding in Feres v. United States.
Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1984).
F. William Heilman was enlisted in the United States Navy from
1944 to 1947, and was a consultant to the Navy from 1947 to 1955.1
During his enlistment and subsequent employment by the Navy,
Heilman was allegedly exposed to radiation and subsequently developed multiple myeloma, a cancer of the bone marrow. 2 In 1981
Mr. Heilman died from complications arising out of that disease.3
Sandra C. Heilman and Dr. Andrew Linz, representatives of the
estate of F. William Heilman, 4 and Sandra C. Heilman in her individual capacity (appellants), brought a wrongful death action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the United States and the United States Department of the Navy.5 The executors of Heilman's estate contended
that his illness and subsequent death had resulted from exposure
to radiation during his military service and later civilian
employment.'
The United States (appellee) moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) 7 for
1. Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1106. While on active duty with the Navy, Heilman was involved in numerous
atomic tests. As a civilian employee of the Navy, Heilman served as a radiological safety
monitor and engineer. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1105. Sandra C. Heilman is the daughter of F. William Heilman. Id. at n.1.
5. Id. at 1105.
6. Id. at 1106.
7. Id. FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) provides in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading . . . shall be as-
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. 8 In granting the motion to dismiss, the United States District Court held that recovery for injuries suffered while Heilman was enlisted in the Navy was barred by
the Supreme Court's decision in Feres v. United States,9 and that
the claim arising out of Heilman's civilian employment was barred
by the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA).'0
The appellants sought reversal of the district court's dismissal of
the action.1" In an opinion delivered by Circuit Judge Garth, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action. 2
Judge Garth's opinion dealt initially with the issue of whether
the injuries arising out of Heilman's military service were actionable."3 In holding that the appellants did not have a claim upon
which relief could be granted, Judge Garth relied upon the
landmark case 4 of Feres v. United States.'5 Judge Garth explained that in Feres, the Supreme Court announced a limitation
to claims arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)16
when it held that the FTCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for suits based on "injuries to servicemen
serted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses, may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted ....
Id.
8. 731 F.2d at 1106.
9. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
10. 731 F.2d at 1106. The Federal Employees Compensation Act provides in part that:
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this subchapter
or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to
the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other
person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil
action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmens compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute.
5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1982).
11. 731 F.2d at 1106.
12. Id. at 1105-06.
13. Id. at 1106.
14. Id. at 1106-09.
15. 340 U.S. at 135. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
16. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides in part: "Itihe United States shall be liable,
respecting. . . tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
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where the injuries7 arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.'1

Judge Garth then addressed appellants' contention that their
suit was not barred by the Feres doctrine since their action was
based on the Government's failure to warn Heilman of the dangers
of radiation, and that this failure to warn had occurred subsequent
to Heilman's discharge from the Navy.' In an attempt to circumvent the Feres doctrine, the appellants in Heilman argued that
their suit was not barred by Feres because the government's failure
to warn Heilman of the dangerous effects of radiation exposure was
a separate and distinct tort which did not occur until 1947, subsequent to his discharge from the Navy, when the United States apparently first became aware of the dangers of radiation."9
Support for appellants' argument was found in United States v.
Brown.20 In Brown, the plaintiff had suffered a knee injury while
on active duty in the military. Seven years after his discharge, the
plaintiff received allegedly negligent treatment of the same knee in
a Veteran's Administration hospital. 21 The Supreme Court allowed
FTCA recovery in Brown because the military doctors were negligent in aggravating the plaintiff's injury, and because the negligent
treatment occurred while he enjoyed civilian status.22 Thus, Brown
implied that an actionable FTCA claim may exist where a serviceman can show that a tort was committed by the government after
17. 731 F.2d at 1106 (citing 340 U.S. at 146).
18. 731 F.2d at 1106-07.
19. Id. at 1107-08.
20. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). See infra note 67.
21. Id. at 110-11.
22. Id. at 112-13. At the time of the alleged negligence Brown was no longer "subject
to military discipline." Id. at 112.
The dissent in Brown argued that the Feres incident to service test calls for a strict causation test. The dissent stated that the plaintiff's injuries were:
inseparably related to military service . . . . But for his army service this veteran
could not have been injured in the veteran's hospital as he was eligible and admitted
for treatment there solely because of war service which gave him veteran status.
Moreover, he was actually being treated for an army service injury.
Id. at 114. (Black, J., dissenting). Subsequent cases involving the Feres doctrine have seemingly followed the "but for" causation test suggested by the Brown dissent. See, e.g., Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983)
(Army's exposure to radiation and post-discharge failure to warn are not two separate torts
but are parts of one continuous tort arising out of military duty); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d
261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983) (alleged post-discharge failure to
warn of radiation dangers merely a Feres-barred continuous tort); Henning v. United States,
446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (post-discharge failure to
warn of an in-service misdiagnosis, when discovered, held to be merely a continuation of the
in-service wrong).
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the plaintiff's military discharge.
Citing Brown, the appellants in Heilman argued that the government's post-discharge failure to warn Heilman was not within the
scope of Feres because it did not occur incident to Heilman's military service. 3 Appellants contended that there were two separate
torts committed against Heilman. They concede that the first tort,
Heilman's initial exposure to radiation, fell within the purview of
Feres. Despite this concession, however, the appellants strongly asserted that the government's post-discharge failure to warn Heilman of the hazards of radiation was a separate and distinct tort
which occurred subsequent to Heilman's discharge and was, therefore, not barred by the Feres doctrine.24
According to Judge Garth, in determining whether the Feres
doctrine will operate to bar a claim, the proper focus should be
"not upon when the injury occurred or when the claim became actionable, but rather the time of, and circumstances surrounding
the negligent act. '2 5 Judge Garth stated that in Henning v. United
States,6 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that when
there exists a duty to warn, that duty arises at the moment that
7
the government first knew, or should have known, of the hazard.
If this duty arose while the injured party was still enlisted in the
28
service, then recovery would be barred by the Feres doctrine.
Although Judge Garth recognized that this type of failure to
warn theory had enjoyed only limited judicial success,29 he inti23. Brief for appellant at 10-13, Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir.
1984).
24. 731 F.2d at 1107. Appellants maintained that because the government had had no
knowledge of the dangers of radiation until 1947, a period after Heilman's discharge, then
the tort could not have occurred until after Heilman's discharge. The court noted, however,
that the appellants' complaint, whose facts were accepted as true, alleged that the government knew of the dangers of radiation while Heilman was in active military service. Thus, a
distinct and separate tort could not have occurred. Id. at 1108. See also infra notes 34-38
and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 1106-07 (citing Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 777 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972)).
26. 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971). For a discussion of Henning, see infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
27. 731 F.2d at 1107 (citing 446 F.2d at 778).
28.

Id.

29. 731 F.2d at 1107. Judge Garth cited Hamilton v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 1146
(D. Mass.), aff'd., 719 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261,
267 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); and Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146,
1153-56 (5th Cir. 1981), as cases in which failure to warn claims were rejected.
Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980), and Thornwell v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979), were cited as cases in which a failure to warn theory
was accepted. The court noted, however, that in both Thornwell and Everett the courts
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mated that such a theory of recovery might be successful if a different set of circumstances were presented.3 0 Judge Garth noted
the case of Broudy v. United States1 in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a claim based on a post-discharge failure to warn should not be dismissed, but rather should
be heard on the merits until it could be determined whether the
failure to warn was a cognizable tort under applicable state law.32
Despite the holding of Broudy, however, Judge Garth declined
to address the failure to warn theory as posed by the appellants'
appeal.3 3 Judge Garth asserted that it was clear that the appel34
lants' pleadings, which the court was obliged to accept as true,
did not allege that appellee's failure to warn arose subsequent to
Heilman's discharge.3 5 According to the court, the appellants' complaint alleged that the United States was aware of the dangers of
radiation at the time of Heilman's exposure during his military
service. 36 Therefore, in light of the appellants' pleadings, Judge
Garth found that the appellee's duty to warn Heilman of the potential dangers of radiation exposure arose at the time of his original exposure.3 7 Judge Garth reasoned, therefore, that since both
the alleged original radiation exposure and the duty to warn arose
while Heilman was enlisted in the Navy, any claims arising out of
such government failures were denied access to the courts by the
38
Feres doctrine.
Judge Garth next considered whether the district court erred
emphasized that the claims would be recognized only if an entirely separate tort, occurring
entirely after discharge, was alleged. 731 F.2d at 1107 n.3.
30. Id. at 1108.
31. 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983) (Broudy II).
32. 731 F.2d at 1108 (citing 722 F.2d at 569).
33. 731 F.2d at 1108.
34. Id. Judge Garth cited McKnight v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 583 F.2d 1229
(3d Cir. 1978), as authority for the proposition that the court was required to credit as true
all of the allegations of the appellants' pleadings. 731 F.2d at 1106. McKnight held that
allegations in the complaint must be taken as true for purposes of determining whether it
was proper to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 583 F.2d at 1235-36.
35. 731 F.2d at 1108. Paragraph 10 of the appellants' complaint averred that by compelling Heilman to participate in atomic tests "defendants knowingly, intentionally, deliberately, recklessly, and/or negligently exposed F. William Heilman, and others similarly situated, to high and dangerous levels of radiation, without their knowledge, permission,
awareness and consent, knowing that said exposure posed a grave risk of injury or death to
decedent and others similarly situated." 731 F.2d at 1108 (citing Complaint, 10).
36. 731 F.2d at 1108.
37. Id. at 1108-09.
38. Id. at 1109.
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when it held that the appellants' claim for damages, arising out of
the alleged radiation exposure while Heilman was employed as a
civilian by the Navy, was barred by the exclusivity provision of the
Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA).39 Judge Garth
noted that under the FECA, a comprehensive program had been
set up to compensate federal employees for injuries suffered pursuant to performance of their duties.4 0 Further, Judge Garth declared
that the FECA is the exclusive remedy for claims arising out of
civilian federal employment.4 1 Finally, he stated that the Secretary
of Labor was the final arbiter of questions concerning whether the
FECA covers an alleged injury, and that any review of the Secretary's decision was absolutely barred.4 2
In accordance with the provisions of the FECA, Judge Garth
held that when a claim is covered by the Act, the courts lack the
requisite subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case since the
United States has not, through the FECA, waived its sovereign immunity.4 3 Judge Garth further held that when it was clear from the
face of the complaint that the plaintiff's injuries were covered by
the FECA, no reason existed for the court to stay further action,
retain jurisdiction, and await the Secretary of Labor's determination regarding FECA coverage.44
In concluding his opinion, Judge Garth recounted that according
to the face of the complaint, it appeared certain that Heilman's
injuries were suffered in his capacity as a civilian employee of the
39. Id. See supra note 10.
40. 731 F.2d at 1109. 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (1982) provides in pertinent part that: "[t]he
United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for the disability or
death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of
his duty ....
" Id.
41. 731 F.2d at 1109. See supra note 10.
42. 731 F.2d at 1109. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
The action of the secretary or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under
this subchapter is - (1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all
questions of law and fact; and (2) not subject to review by another official of the
United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise.
Id.
43. 731 F.2d at 1109-10. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Joyce v.
United States, 474 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1973), wherein the court stated that the FECA provides
and has been made the exclusive remedy for employees within its coverage, that no election
of remedies exists, and that until there is a clear showing of relinquishment of sovereign
immunity, no action against the United States will lie. Id. at 218-19.
44. 731 F.2d at 1110-11. The court cited Chasis v. Progress Mfg Co., 382 F.2d 773 (3d
Cir. 1967), for this proposition. The Chasis court concluded that pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a) "it is 'hornbook law' that the jurisdiction of a District Court must appear affirmatively
on the face of the [C]omplaint." Id. at 776. Thus, if the complaint establishes jurisdiction
within the FECA, a plaintiff will not have recourse to the district court.
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United States. Therefore, such injuries were covered by the FECA
and were compensable only by the Secretary of Labor. 5 Thus, the
court declared that in light of Feres and the provisions of the
FECA, it would affirm the lower court's dismissal of appellants'
complaint.'8
In a concurring opinion, Judge Adams accepted the reasoning
and the judgment of Judge Garth's majority opinion.47 Judge Adams, however, used his concurring opinion as a forum to voice concern about the limited relief afforded to persons injured while serv48
ing their country.
According to Judge Adams, the decision by the Feres court to
limit remedies available to veterans and their families was influenced by the existence of an alternative system of relief operated
by the Veterans' Administration.49 Judge Adams believed, however, that due to the complexity of some injuries currently confronting certain veterans, this system of relief was no longer
adequate."
45. 731 F.2d at 1110.
46. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the court stated:
In a case such as this, where the plaintiff's own pleadings aver facts which establish
to a certainty that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist in the district court because of the Secretary's exclusive role in adjudicating FECA claims, then the district
court has no choice but to dismiss the action. We can therefore find no error in the
order of the district court below.
Id.
The court also dismissed the appellants' secondary argument that the FECA is inapplicable to cases that involve intentional torts. The appellants asserted that the situation involved herein was akin to a private employer having committed an intentional tort upon its
employee. In such situations, the appellants asserted, several state courts have held that
state workmen's compensation statutes, which generally supply the exclusive remedy for
work related injuries, do not bar independent lawsuits against the employer for intentional
wrongdoings. See, e.g., Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694 (1963);
Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F.
Supp. 357 (W.D. Pa. 1982). The fallacy behind this assertion, according to the court, was
that unlike the Federal Government, private employers cannot assert the defense of sovereign immunity, whereby, they cannot protect themselves from legal action should an employee have a legitimate claim against them. Therefore, if the FECA were to apply, it would
matter not whether the injury were the result of a negligent act because in either case jurisdiction would not lie. 731 F.2d at 1111 n.6.
47. 731 F.2d at 1111. (Adams, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1112.
50. Id. at 1111. Judge Adams noted that the common law view of sovereign immunity
had resulted in the apparent injustice of allowing the tortious acts of governmental agents
to go uncompensated. To remedy this situation, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U.S. C. § 2674 (1982), which allowed suits against the Federal Government
in situations where a private person would be liable under similar circumstances. Judge
Adams further stated that the judicial carve out in Feres, which prohibited members of the
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Judge Adams concluded by arguing that a new system must be
developed to deal with the injuries and problems presently affecting those who have served their country. 51 He contended, however,
that it is the responsibility of the legislature, and not the judiciary,
to develop a system that would effectively place the burden of defending our country upon society as a whole, rather than upon veterans and their families.52
In 1948 Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 3
The FTCA established a limited waiver of the traditional sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the United States Government. The FTCA
provides that the United States shall be liable for its torts "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
'5 4
like circumstances.
Congress, however, placed several limitations upon this ability to
sue the government. The FTCA explicitly exempts certain types of
claims from its waiver of sovereign immunity, including claims of
military personnel that arise from military or naval wartime activities. 5 5 The FTCA does not, however, contain a general exception
barring all tort claims of servicemen.5 6 Such an exception was judimilitary from suing the government, although sensible in its limited context, had been too
liberally expanded. As such, the efficacy of the FTCA, in allowing recovery to veterans
"whose need for a remedy is particularly acute," has been severely curtailed. Id. at 1111-12.
51. Id. at 1113.
52. Id.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671-80 (1982).
54. Id. at 2674. Under the act, federal district courts are granted exclusive original
jurisdiction over claims of personal injury or property damage against the United States
which are caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the United
States government, while that employee is acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
55. Id. § 2680(j).
56. Id. There is a clear indication from the statements of the drafters of the FTCA
that the act was not meant to prohibit tort claims of servicemen. In United States v. Brooks,
169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that all members of the armed forces were, by implication, excluded from the coverage of the FTCA. In a statement to the Yale Law Review on November 26, 1948, Representative Emanuel Cellers, a key figure in the passage of the FTCA,
challenged the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit:
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit is utterly erroneous when it says that it was the
intent of Congress to exclude a member of the armed forces from the benefits of the
Tort Claims Act . . . .I had more to do with [the act] than any other member. I
never intended to preclude a suit by a soldier. Despite the fact that the latter might
have various and sundry remedies for compensation, pensions, hospitalization preferences, etc., these benefits had nothing whatsoever to do with, and are utterly unrelated to the right to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act. . . . [Tihe government
deliberately removes the defense of sovereignty except in cases where the Act specifically makes an exception. The exception cannot be implied; it must be expressed.
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cially created by the United States Supreme Court in Feres v.
57
United States.
In Feres and its companion cases, 58 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the FTCA extended its remedy to
cases involving the injury or death of a serviceman occurring "incident to service. '59 In announcing the sole judicially created exception to the FTCA, 60 the Supreme Court held that the government
shall not be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries
to servicemen when such injuries arise from or occur during the
course of activities which are "incident to service." 61
As recently as 1977 the Supreme Court, in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,6 2 had occasion to reaffirm the validity of the Feres doctrine. The Court in Stencel illuminated the
underlying rationale of the Feres doctrine by first pointing out that
The court cannot read the exception into the law.
Statement from Representative Cellers to Yale Law Review (Nov. 26, 1948), (quoted in
Note, Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act 58 YALE L.J. 615, 621 n.26
(1949)). For a discussion of Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), see infra note 57.
57. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the government's FTCA liability towards servicemen in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949),
rev'g 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948). In Brooks, the court permitted a serviceman, injured in
an off-base auto accident while on furlough, to bring an action under the FTCA. Id. at 54.
The court held that the FTCA permitted servicemen to bring tort claims against the government where the claims were not incident to military service. Id. at 51. In Brooks, the court
declined to decide whether an incident to service tort would be actionable under the FTCA.
Id. at 52.
58. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom, Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), and Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), aff'd, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) were the companion cases considered in conjunction with Feres.
59. 340 U.S. at 138. Feres involved a negligence action brought by the wife of a serviceman killed in a barracks fire. Id. at 137. The companion cases of Jefferson and Griggs
involved the alleged negligent treatment of the plaintiffs by army surgeons. Id. at 136-37.
60. Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 264 (8th Cir. 1982)("The Feres doctrine [is] the
only judicially created exception to the FTCA.").
61. 340 U.S. 146. The court went on to state:
Without exception, the relationship of military personnel to the Government has
been governed exclusively by federal law. We do not think that Congress, in drafting
this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected
injuries or death due to negligence. We cannot impute to Congress such a radical
departure from established law in the absence of express congressional command.
Id. The court also stated that "[tihe primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to
those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided for, it
appears to have been unintentional." Id. at 140.
62. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, a national guard pilot suffered injury due to the
malfunction of an ejection system. Id. at 667. The guardsman sued the manufacturer of the
system who in turn sought indemnity from the United States government. Id. at 668. Citing
Feres, the court refused to allow indemnification. Id. at 673-74.
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intramilitary immunity was necessary to preserve the uniquely federal character of the relationship between the government and its
servicemen. 3 The Court stated that it would be illogical for the
government's liability to be based upon the fortuity of where a soldier happened to be stationed at the time of injury. 4 Secondly, the
Court stated that the Veterans Benefit Act (VBA)' 5 provides a no
fault system of compensation that serves as a substitute for tort
liability. 6 Finally, the Court elucidated the undermining effects
that FTCA suits for7 "incident to service" torts would have upon
6
military discipline.
By classifying the government's conduct towards a discharged
serviceman as incident to service, any FTCA claim based on a
post-discharge failure to warn theory will, in most cases, be precluded by the Feres doctrine. Thus, as a result of the insufficiency
of the relief offered by the VBA to servicemen who have suffered
radiation-related injuries, 8 the application of the Feres doctrine
often serves to "deny a cause of action to plaintiffs whose need for
a remedy is particularly acute."69
The first case to deal with the separate post-discharge tort issue,
outside of the medical malpractice context, was Thornwell v.
United States.70 Thornwell involved the unwitting participation
by a serviceman in the experimental testing of the effects of the
hallucinogenic drug, L.S.D. 71 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia held that when the military commits an
63. Id. at 671.
64. Id.
65. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-1008 (1982). For a discussion of pertinent portions of the VBA,
see infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
66. 431 U.S. at 671.
67. Id. at 671-72. The military discipline rationale was first emphasized in United
States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). In Brown the court stated that:
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if
suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the [Feres] Court to read that Act
as excluding claims of that character.
Id. at 112. See Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983)(Feres seems best explained
by the special relationship between a soldier and his superiors). See also Hunt v. United
States, 636 F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980)("protection of military discipline... serves largely
if not exclusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine").
68. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
69. 731 F.2d at 1112 (Adams, J., concurring).
70. 471 F.Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979)(mem.).
71. Id. at 346. The plaintiff in Thornwell complained that his participation resulted in
a 17 year history of serious mental illness and physical pain. Id. at 346-47.
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intentional act and then negligently fails to protect a former serviceman from the consequences that are likely to result from that
act, the injured civilian may have a valid FTCA claim against the
government. 72 Thornwell was, therefore, entitled to recover for the
post-discharge conduct of the government because he had asserted
"two entirely different torts" that involved "two distinctly separate
patterns of conduct." 73In reaching its conclusion, the court in
Thornwell distinguished three types of cases involving post-discharge negligence.74 The first type of case is characterized by the
commission of two distinct negligent acts by government officials;
the first occurring while the individual was in the service, and the
second occurring after the individual has attained civilian status. 75
The court in Thornwell cited United States v. Brown" as an
example of the separate negligent acts type of case.77 The Brown
court had held that the allegedly negligent post-discharge treatment of an incident to service injury was not within the scope of
Feres despite the fact that the post-discharge treatment was necessitated by the negligent in-service treatment.7"
The second type of case recognized by the Thornwell court involved situations in which government officials committed a negligent act against a serviceman, and the effects of the in-service negligent act continued to affect the serviceman subsequent to his
72. Id. at 352. The court held that recovery for post-discharge injuries was consistent
with Feres and "compelled by Brown." Id. at 349.
73. Id. at 351. The court concluded that the recovery for post-discharge negligence was
compatible with the factors enumerated in Stencel: (1) the special relationship between a
soldier and his superiors had ceased and thus the maintenance of a law suit would not affect
military discipline; (2) as a civilian, Thornwell no longer maintained a distinctly federal
relationship with the government; and (3) the statutory no-fault remedy was "certainly
more remote for veterans than for enlisted men." Id. at 350.
Thornwell, however, was rejected as "inconsistent with Feres" in Laswell v. Brown, 683
F.2d 261, 267 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). In Heilman, the court
stated that to "the extent that Thornwell would allow a cause of action for failure to warn,
when any duty to warn arose in the course of military service, we decline to follow it." 731
F.2d at 1109 n.5.
74. 471 F. Supp. at 352.
75. Id.
76. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
77. 471 F. Supp. at 352. Another example, cited by the court in Thornwell is Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d
99 (9th Cir. 1962), where the court held that Feres was not applicable although the postdischarge tort caused "not an aggravation, but merely an unnecessary continuation of the
plaintiff's combat injury." 192 F. Supp. at 583-84.
78. 348 U.S. at 112.
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discharge.7 The Thornwell court cited Henning v. United States0
as an example of a "continuing tort" case. 8 In Henning, the serviceman's x-rays were allegedly misread while he was on active
duty with the Army.82 Henning claimed that he suffered a recoverable injury under Brown"3 due to the Army doctor's subsequent
post-discharge failure to warn him of his true condition. 84 In denying Henning's claim, the court concluded that although Henning's
condition deteriorated after the occurrence of the negligent act,
that negligence occurred only once, during Henning's tenure in the
military, and, therefore, recovery could not be had. 5
The final situation recognized by the court in Thornwell arises
in situations in which the military has committed an intentional
wrongful act and then has been negligent in failing to protect a
former serviceman from the consequences that are likely to result
from that act. 86 The plaintiff in Thornwell alleged the kind and
sequence of torts of this third type of case. It was asserted that the
plaintiff suffered an intentional tort in the in-service drug experi79. 471 F. Supp. at 352.
80. 446 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). See supra notes 6668 and accompanying text.
81. 471 F. Supp. at 351.
82. 446 F.2d at 775.
83. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
84. 446 F.2d at 777.
85. Id. at 778. Specifically, the Henning court stated that, "[wihile it cannot be disputed . . . that Henning's tubercular condition grew steadily worse after the negligence of
the . . . authorities properly to read his x-rays prior to his discharge, that failure occurred
but once and Henning's disaster is due to that failure." Id.
The court further stated that "[to] support Henning's claim we would have to treat the
. . . medical authorities' failure as a continuous one terminating only . . . when Henning
was informed of his tubercular condition. This seems beyond the contemplation of the Federal Tort Claims Act as interpreted by Feres." Id.
86. 471 F. Supp. at 352. The court in Thornwell cited Schwartz v. United States, 230
F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964), afl'd, 381 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1967), as an example of a case that
falls within this third type of situation. In Schwartz, Navy doctors failed to remove a radioactive dye from the plaintiff's sinuses after an x-ray was taken while he was in the service.
Subsequent to his discharge from the service, he continued to receive treatment in a VA
hospital for his sinus problem. The plaintiff alleged that the government doctors negligently
failed to determine the nature of the substance contained in the plaintiff's sinuses and
based his FTCA claim on the government's post-discharge failure to discover and remove
the dye. The court found that the original use of the dye was distinct from the post-service
negligent treatment and that the failure to warn Schwartz constituted a separate post discharge tort. Id. at 540. The district court concluded that the negligence was not in the installation of the dye, "but rather in not having affirmatively sought out those who had been
endangered after there was knowledge of the danger in order to warn them that in the
supposedly innocent treatment there had now been found to lurk the risk of devastating
injury." Id.
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mentation program and injury due to negligence from the government's post-discharge failure to provide follow up care."
Since Thornwell was decided, several veterans have attempted
to rely on that court's reasoning in their efforts to recover for injuries resulting from their service-related exposure to hazardous substances. For example, in Everett v. United States 8 the surviving
spouse of a deceased serviceman sued the government. She claimed
that her husband's cancer-related death was a result of his in-service exposure to hazardous doses of radiation which was exacerbated by the government's post-discharge failure to warn him of
the dangers associated with radiation exposure.8 9 The Everett
court, citing Thornwell, held that the plaintiff had a cause of action because she had alleged an intentional in-service tort followed
by a post-discharge negligent failure to warn the decedent of the
dangers to which he had been exposed.9 0 The court concluded that
Feres would not bar the plaintiff's action where the failure to warn
occurred after the decedent's discharge. 9'
In an apparent attempt to utilize the Thornwell analysis, some
courts have interpreted the Thornwell opinion as requiring the inservice act to be intentional. These courts have so concluded, despite clear indications from the language of the opinion and from
the cases cited by the Thornwell court, that a plaintiff may also
recover, under some circumstances, if the in-service act is merely
87. 471 F. Supp. at 346-47. The court did note, however, that any injuries received
while on active duty were completely barred by Feres. Id. at 357.
88. 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980). Although the court eventually held that the
plaintiff's fifth count had stated a cause of action (intentional in-service tort followed by a
post-discharge failure to warn), the court rejected several of the plaintiff's other counts. The
plaintiff originally alleged that a "reckless tort committed against a serviceman" was not
barred by the Feres doctrine. The court disagreed. Whether the tort was reckless, intentional, or negligent was unimportant. Rather, as the court pointed out, it was the situs of the
tort that would determine the liability of the United States. Id. at 321.
Likewise, the court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the responsible military officers
were directly responsible under the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs had cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), wherein the Supreme Court had
allowed the plaintiff to sue the government due to the violation of the plaintiff's rights by
the agents. The Everett court again disagreed. The court stated that to allow such a suit,
sounding in constitutional tort, "would permit abrogation of Feres-based immunity through
a mere exercise in pleading." 492 F. Supp. at 322.
89. Id. at 319-20. The plaintiff contended that in 1953 Everett and other servicemen
were ordered to march through a nuclear blast area less than one hour after the detonation
of a nuclear device, resulting in exposure to hazardous amounts of radiation. Id. at 319.
90. Id. at 325-26.
91. Id. at 326. The court noted, however, that the plaintiff could proceed only under
the FTCA. Her claim against the United States made directly under the U.S. Const.
amends. V and IX was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 325.

322

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:309

negligent.9 2 This approach is illustrated by the holding of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Stanley v. CIA.'" In Stanley, a veteran
charged the government with negligence for failing to debrief and
monitor him after he was administered L.S.D. as a part of an inservice military experiment. " Although the facts of the case were
very similar to those presented in Thornwell, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Thornwell theory of recovery was inapplicable because the
plaintiff had "failed to allege an intentional tort committed while
he was in the service."9 5
The reasoning most frequently used, however, in denying recovery for claims based on a post-discharge failure to warn theory is
the continuous tort analysis; based on the second type of case recognized by the Thornwell court."' Under this type of analysis, after
finding that the post-discharge failure to warn is merely a part of a
single tort, originating in service, the courts have concluded that
only one continuous tort has occurred and that it therefore falls
within the operation of the Feres doctrine.
The utilization of the continuous tort analysis was illustrated by
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Lombard v.
United States.e7 In Lombard, the plaintiff's claim alleged two distinct wrongful acts by the government: the initial in-service exposure to radiation and the post-discharge withholding of information concerning the carcinogenic effects of radiation exposure."
The second act was alleged to have occurred entirely after the
plaintiff's discharge from the Army, and thus it was argued that it
was not subject to the Feres doctrine. "9 In rejecting Lombard's sep92. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
93. 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 1149.
95. Id. at 1154. The court noted that "[elven if Stanley's allegations of negligence suffice as the original tort, however, he has failed to allege a separate negligent act occurring
'entirely after discharge.'" Id.
See also Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980)(plaintiff's recovery for injuries resulting from in-service exposure to mustard gas was precluded by the
Feres doctrine).
96. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
97. 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
98. Id. at 220.
99. Id. The court indicated that this notion had been rejected by various other courts.
See, e.g., Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981)(governmental failure to
warn actionable only if discovered after discharge of the serviceman); Schnurman v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980)(recovery for failing to monitor and treat injuries
resulting from the same tort would leave very little of Feres immunity); Wisniewski v.
United States, 416 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976)(no claim for failing to provide, after discharge, results of blood test taken while in service).
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arate tort argument and dismissing his FTCA claim, the court concluded that the government's failure to warn Lombard could not
be regarded as a wholly post-discharge act because, by the plaintiff's own admission as contained in his complaint, the Army knew
of the hazards of radiation at the time of the plaintiff's original
exposure to radiation.1 00 Because the failure to inform Lombard of
the hazards of radiation originated while he was in the service, the
post-discharge failure to warn was held to be part of one continuous tort originating incident to service.' ° '
Similarly, the court in Heilman, following the reasoning of the
0 2 held that it was unable
District of Columbia Circuit in Lombard,"
to provide relief to the appellants because, by the appellants' own
admission contained in their pleadings, the government's failure to
warn Heilman arose during his military service.10 3 After finding
that the government's failure to warn Heilman arose while Heilman was serving in the Navy, the court held that, pursuant to the
Feres doctrine, it did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the ap10 4
pellants' claims.
The court also cited the Thornwell pronouncement that mere acts of negligence occurring
in service, remaining uncorrected after discharge, do not give rise to a cause of action, as
supportive of its conclusion. 690 F.2d at 222.
100. Id. at 220.
101. Id. The court also reviewed the Feres doctrine rationale as outlined in Stencel
and found that Lombard's action for post-discharge concealment was federal in nature; that
Lombard had an alternative remedy under the VBA; and that hearing Lombard's claim of
nondisclosure could undermine military discipline. Id. at 221.
See also Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982)(the Thornwell position is inconsistent with Feres; the government's post-discharge failure to warn was merely a continuation
of the Feres-barred failure to warn), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Monaco v. United
States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981)(the government act for which the plaintiff sought relief
was the in-service radiation exposure; when the plaintiff's injury manifested itself was immaterial), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3rd
Cir. 1971)(negligent in-service misreading of an x-ray was the basis for the government's
post-discharge failure to advise the veteran of a tubercular condition), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1016 (1972); Kelly v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1981). In Kelly, the court
concluded that there was no difference between the government's failure to warn Kelly
while he was in the service and the failure to warn him subsequent to his discharge:
[u]nless liability for post-discharge negligent omissions by the government is carefully
limited to situations in which the conduct challenged is clearly distinct from military
actions immune under Feres, military planners who have knowledge of particular
risks associated with an operation may well be inhibited in their planning by the
consideration that at some future date they might be obligated to reveal the details of
the operation and the risks involved.
Id. at 361.
102. For a discussion of Lombard, see supra.notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
104. 731 F.2d at 1109.
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In breaking from what had become the clear majority view in the
area, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit permitted the
plaintiff to advance her FTCA claim based on a unique theory of
recovery. ' In the Broudy cases, the plaintiff's husband had been
ordered to participate in military exercises associated with atomic
tests. Plaintiff's husband subsequently died of cancer seventeen
years later without ever having been informed by the government
of the dangers associated with radiation exposure. In Broudy I, the
court held that the plaintiff's claim for post-discharge failure to
warn and to monitor possible medical disorders might constitute
an independent post-discharge tort actionable under the FTCA if
the government became aware of the dangers of radiation exposure
after Broudy had left the military. 06 However, because the appellant's allegations did not clearly indicate a separate post-discharge
tort occurring when the government learned of the dismal effects
of radiation, the court remanded to the district court to allow the
appellant further opportunity to develop her case in light of the
1 07
court's holding.
Upon remand, the district court again granted the government's
motion to dismiss, and the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a
second time in Broudy II.'08 Again vacating the district court's dismissal and remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that
the appellants' contention of a tort, premised upon an alleged independent duty to monitor or warn Broudy, should be heard on
the merits in the district court. 0 9 Because the district court was to
determine the liability of the United States in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred," 0 the court
remanded for further proceedings to determine where the alleged
failure to warn occurred so as to determine which state's law would
govern."'
105. Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981)(Broudy I); Broudy v.
United States, 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983)(Broudy II).
106. 661 F.2d at 128-29.
107. Id. at 129.
108. 722 F.2d at 570.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id. at 570. See also Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985). In Cole,
the plaintiffs' proposed amendment to their complaint asserted that "the government's negligent failure to warn materialized after Cole's discharge when the government's knowledge
concerning the hazards of radiation increased sufficiently to give rise to a new duty." Id. at
876 (emphasis in original). In following the Broudy decisions, the court concluded:
the Feres doctrine does not preclude the cause of action pled in the plaintiffs' proposed amendment. Because the government's tortious conduct is alleged to have oc-
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In Heilman, by determining that the government's post-discharge failure to warn was part of one continuous Feres-barred
tort," 2 the Third Circuit successfully avoided the consideration of
the issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit in its Broudy decisions.1 1 3
Under the current state of the law there are apparently three
views concerning post-discharge torts: (1) recovery should be allowed only if the original tort is intentional;"" (2) recovery should
be allowed only if the government learned of the possible harm to
the serviceman after the serviceman's discharge;' and, (3) a postdischarge tort is merely a continuation of an incident to service
tort, and therefore recovery should not be allowed. 1 ' However, as
stated above, the majority of courts are unwilling to look beyond
the fact that but for the in-service wrongful conduct of the government towards the serviceman, his claim for post-discharge
breaches of duty would never have arisen,117 and therefore conclude that the claim is barred by Feres.
Despite the sound underlying rationale utilized by the Supreme
Court in deciding Feres," s the Feres doctrine has clearly become
inadequate to resolve problems that could not have been contemplated by the Court when Feres was decided. The effect that suits
arising out of military service will have upon military discipline is
curred after Cole was discharged, the resulting injury was not "incident to service"
since there is no significant potential adverse effect on military discipline and no risk
of undesirable and fortuitous applications of state law. There is a sufficient allegation
of analogous state right and the VBA does not preclude a recovery under these circumstances. Accordingly the district court erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion to
amend.
Id. at 880 (footnotes omitted).
112. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
113. 731 F.2d at 1108. The court in Heilman cited the Broudy cases but gave no clear
indication as to whether it would follow or reject the Broudy holdings if faced with a similar
issue. Id.
114. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
In comparing the continuous-tort analysis used in cases such as Lombard and Heilman to
the approach used by the Ninth Circuit in its Broudy decisions, an anomalous situation
becomes apparent. If the government possessed knowledge of the dangers of radiation exposure and thus intentionally subjected a serviceman to such hazards, a continuous tort is
found to exist and the serviceman's claim is barred by Feres. But if the government did not
learn of the specific risks related to radiation exposure until after a serviceman's discharge,
the serviceman would have a valid claim based on the government's negligent failure to
warn since this failure occurred entirely after discharge. This situation seems to condone the
intentional exposure of servicemen to hazardous substances; the government is free from
tort liability when its conduct was most culpable.
117. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text; supra note 69.
118. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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the most often cited reason for barring a veteran's FTCA claim.""
However, the connection between post-discharge failure-to-warn
suits and detrimental effects on military discipline is rather dubious. The courts seem to "rely on previous decisions and broad
statements that they present as self-evident truths requiring little
explication and even less real evidence."' 20
An exception to this observance is Cole v. United States.' In
holding that the plaintiff may have a cause of action based on a
theory similar to that presented in the Broudy cases,122 the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it did not believe that allowing the veteran a cause of action under the FTCA
would affect military discipline to any significant extent. 23 The
Cole court reasoned that the investigation of the claim would be
limited to the government's knowledge, before and after Cole's discharge, of the hazards of radiation exposure. 2 2 The court further
stated that allowing Cole's case to proceed would not result in a
situation in which a superior's orders, in relation to any serviceman
on active duty, would be second-guessed. 2 5 The court concluded
that the sole question involved was one of government policy towards veterans and not one that would implicate military
discipline. 2 "
119. See supra note 67.
120. Bennett, The Feres Doctrine,Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 383, 402 (1985). The author concludes:
The Feres doctrine is a case study in the mechanistic application of the law. Its
original premises were too slender to survive. When an acceptable rationale was
adopted, repetition made it shibboleth before it was seriously examined. When examined, that rationale cannot stand, as those courts have bravely abandoned its rigidity have discovered. But most courts have been too bound by Feres for too long, and
so the atomic veterans are left to die their unprecendented deaths. If Feres can countenance such a result, what past injustices might it also have wrought?
Id. at 420.
121. 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985). See supra note 111.
122. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
123. 755 F.2d at 878.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 879. The court found the situations anticipated by Feres to be distinguishable stating that "[1]itigating the issues in Feres would have involved investigating the military's quartering practices and methods of providing medical treatment for soldiers on active duty. Similarly, proving the allegations in Stencel and Chappell would have
necessitated examination of military equipment schemes and promotion and assignment
policies." Id. The court concluded that it found the potential danger that probes into the
government practices would adversely affect future practices of the armed forces to be "too
remote to be accorded significant weight when the decision only indirectly involves military
orders or practices concerning active duty soldiers." Id.
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With the exception of Cole, the federal courts have consistently
neglected to consider the issue of whether such suits will, in actuality, adversely affect military discipline. To the contrary, the courts
have simply "presumed [that a] generalized effect on discipline
27
justifies dismissal of a lawsuit.'
The second commonly espoused reason for denying redress
under the FTCA, the availability of a remedy under the Veterans
Benefit Act (VBA),112 similarly does not withstand close scrutiny.
The Veteran's Administration (VA) will award compensation for
personal injuries or aggravation of preexisting injuries suffered or
diseases contracted in the line of duty. 2 9 This would seem to cover
situations involving radiation related injuries. In most cases, 3 '
however, the burden is on the veteran to establish the connection
between the injury or disease complained of and the specific causal
event occurring in service. 131 Due to the insufficiency and uncertainty of scientific knowledge concerning the effects of exposure to
127. 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. at 402-05. The author continues:
The courts have analyzed these unprecedented claims with anciently conceived
precepts that are not up to the task. The enormity of the potential liability begins,
rather than ends, the analysis, and argues as strongly for government responsibility as
against it. Instead of denying liability because it is too vast, the courts-or Congress-must decide who will bear the cost of new military technologies. As long as
such technologies are used, the injuries complained of are a cost of warfare as surely
as soldiers cut down by enemy bullets. Deliberate governmental policy created this
cost; it is disingenuous to now cite that policy's grave effects in defense of the
Government.
It is specious even to discuss governmental liability. Costs borne by the government
are ultimately borne by society as a whole. The costs of war are inflicted in defense of
society. If the Nation wants such protection, it should be willing to pay a just price
for it.
Id. at 416.
128. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-1008 (1982).
129. Id. §§ 310, 331; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.301-.305 (1984). Section 310 states:
Basic Entitlement
For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of
duty, or for aggravation of preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of
duty, in active military, naval, or air service during a period of war, the United States
will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was discharged under conditions other
than dishonorable from the period of service in which said injury or disease was incurred, or preexisting injury or disease was aggravated, compensation as provided in
this subchapter ...,but no compensation shall be paid if the disability is the result
of the veteran's own willful misconduct.
38 U.S.C. § 310 (1982).
130. For some diseases the VA will presume the causal connection torthe in-service
activity. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 312, 333, 337 (1982). Under § 312, tropical diseases, tuberculosis,
multiple sclerosis, and Hansen's disease are, under certain circumstances, presumed to have
been incurred during service. Id.
131. 31 AM. U.L. RE.v. 1104-05 (1982).
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hazardous substances, establishing this causal connection is most
difficult for veterans who have suffered such exposure. 3 ' Finally, if
the VA denies a veteran's claim for benefits, the veteran's only appeal is through the agency,133 and the decision of the agency is not
subject to judicial review.134
These factors have combined to severely limit the ability of veterans to recover from the VA for injuries and diseases suffered as a
result of exposure to radiation. 3 5 As stated by Judge Adams in his
concurring opinion in Heilman, "[t]here is reason to believe that
this system [for compensation of veterans and their families] has
broken down."136
The remaining factor provide by the Supreme Court in Stencel
Aero EngineeringCorp. v. United States,'37 as one of the underlying bases for the Feres doctrine, is that the government's liability
in these situations should not depend on the fortuity of where a
serviceman was stationed at the time of his injury. 3 ' The validity
of this factor, unlike the two factors previously discussed, has not
been discredited by the emergence of veterans' claims based on in132. See Comment, When a Veteran "Wants" Uncle Sam: Theories of Recovery For
Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous Substances, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (1982).
In 1979, the Senate attempted to modify the VBA by subjecting VA benefit decisions to
judicial review, codifying VA adjudication proceedings, requiring the VA to comply with
notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and removing the ten dollar limit on fees paid to an attorney representing a veteran before the VA.
The House failed to consider the measure. Id. at 1107-08.
133. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.1-.2 (1984).
134. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). The extent of this bar to review is unparalleled in the
administrative and regulatory sector. See 31 AM. U.L. REV. at 1106-07. But see infra note
149.
135. See Comment, Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A Veterans Last
Battle, 14 PAc. L.J. 333, 352-53 (1983). The author states that unlike workers compensation

benefits, veterans' compensation is hardly a certainty. This, according to the author, is due
to the fact that such compensation has been viewed as "merely a gratuity that can be revoked for a variety of reasons." Id. at 352. "As a practical matter the benefits are not compensating these [atomic] veterans as the courts have expected." Therefore, the post-service
tort remedy is consistent with Feres and Stencel and should be accepted by the courts. Id.
at 353.
136. 731 F.2d at 1112 (Adams, J., concurring).
The Eleventh Circuit in Cole, 755 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985), stated that how the VBA
factor is to be treated is unclear. The court stated that in Brown and Brooks the Supreme
Court held that the Feres doctrine did not bar the plaintiffs' FTCA claims even though they
were receiving veterans' benefits. However, the Cole court stated, in Stencel the Supreme
Court indicated that the VBA provided an exclusive remedy. The Cole court concluded,
nevertheless, that because the plaintiffs alleged that the injury was not incident to service,
the VBA did not bar the claim. Id. at 879.
137. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
138. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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service exposure to radiation. As recognized in Broudy 11,139 the
courts must "determine the liability of the United States 'in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.' "1" Thus, if claims based on post-discharge failure to warn
theories were permitted to be advanced under the FTCA, the liability of the United States certainly would be dependent upon "the
fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time
of his injury."""
This review of Feres and its rationale and of the pertinent cases
decided under the Feres doctrine clearly demonstrates that the existing system of compensating veterans proves extremely inadequate when applied to veterans who have suffered radiation related
injuries. The military discipline factor and the VBA benefits factor
relied on by the Supreme Court in justifying Feres no longer remain viable justifications for denying the claims of these veterans.
Nevertheless, to require these veterans to rely on the judicial process for compensation of their injuries will similarly lead to inequitable results.
Under the FTCA, the veteran's right to compensation will depend on the law of the state where the wrongful act or omission
occurred.14 2 Thus, the concerns of the Supreme Court voiced in
Feres and Stencel concerning the unpredictability of the government's liability are well grounded. Furthermore, as the above reviewed cases illustrate, leaving the problem to the litigation process has resulted in what Judge Adams, concurring in Heilman,
has declared to be an inequitable "patchwork of exceptions to a
generally salutary rule. 1 43 In In re "Agent Orange" Products Lia14 4
bility Litigation,
Judge Pratt characterized post-service failure
139. 722 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1983).
140. Id. at 569 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982)). The Broudy II court went on to
state that "the elements, defenses and damages in a tort claim are all governed by state
law." 722 F.2d at 569.
141. 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977). But cf. Cole, 755 F.2d 873, 879 (11th Cir. 1985) ("because the alleged failure to warn occurred after discharge-the choice of law does not depend on where Cole was stationed when exposed to the radiation.").
142. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
143. 731 F.2d at 1112 (Adams, J., concurring).
144. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 1128 (1981). In In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation,four groups of
plaintiffs: Vietnam veterans; their wives; their parents; and their children, asserted various
claims against, inter alia, the United States. Id. at 769. In concluding that Feres barred any
action against the United States, the court entered into a detailed discussion of Feres.
Among other things, the court noted that while the wisdom of Feres may be dubious, Congress had failed, in more than 30 years, to amend the Feres holding. Thus, according to the
court, the legislature had sub silentio approved of Feres, "strongly suggestfing] that the
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to warn claims and the models of Thornwell as a "difficult area of
analysis" pervaded by "inconsistencies." 1 5
A majority of the courts refuse to make inroads into the Feres
based intramilitary immunity absent congressional action. In Lombard v. United States,148 the District Court for the District of Columbia stated that if these veterans and their families are to be
compensated, "it is for Congress, not the courts, to fashion a remedy. The Court will not carve out an exception to sovereign immunity in a situation where the rationale underlying Feres does not
47
clearly mandate such a step."'

Because of the difficulties faced by radiation exposed veterans in
their efforts to obtain redress from the federal courts and from the
VA, compensation is regularly denied to "plaintiffs whose need for
a remedy is particularly acute."'
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Indeed, as Judge Adams has

poignantly indicated:
[I]f we are to fulfill the duty described by Lincoln and inscribed on the
Veterans' Administration building of "car[ing] for those who have borne the
battle," a system must be developed by which those who have suffered for
their country can be compensated. However, this responsibility under our
form of government belongs not to the judiciary, but to the legislature.
Given the courts' already overcrowded dockets and their inability to provide
relief to these claimants under the Feres doctrine, it would appear most
appropriate for Congress to consider legislation that shifts the cost of defending our country to society as a whole and away from veterans and their
families.' 49
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Supreme Court correctly interpreted Congressional intent." Id. at 771.
The court then distinguished Thornwell and similar cases, holding that in the instant case
any post-discharge failure to warn was not indicative of post-discharge negligence by the
government. Further, the plaintiffs herein, unlike those in Thornwell and Everett did not
allege that the government committed an intentional act upon them. Id. at 778-79.
The court did state, however, that a cause of action would lie, in a Schwartz situation, if
any veteran, receiving post-discharge treatment for an Agent Orange related illness, were
negligently treated at a government hospital. In such a situation, a second distinct tort
would have occurred which would thus render Feres nugatory. Id.
145. Id. at 779.
146. 530 F. Supp. 918 (D.D.C. 1981), afl'd, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1118 (1983).
147. Id. at 922.
148. 731 F.2d at 1112 (Adams, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1113 (Adams, J., concurring).
Congress has recently taken the initial step in an attempt to provide compensation for
veterans (and their survivors) who have been exposed to hazardous substances. In the Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98
Stat. 2725 (1984), Congress has directed the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to establish
guidelines and to proscribe regulations for the purpose of:
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ensur[ing] that Veterans' Administration disability compensation is provided to veterans who were exposed during service in the Armed Forces in the Republic of Vietnam to a herbicide containing dioxin or to ionizing radiation in connection with atmospheric nuclear tests or in connection with the American occupation of Hiroshima
or Nagasaki, Japan, for all disabilities arising after that service that are connected,
based on sound scientific and medical evidence, to such service (and that Veterans'
Administration dependency and indemnity compensation is provided to survivors of
those veterans for all deaths, resulting from such disabilities).
Id. at § 3 (emphasis added).
The guidelines established are to include criteria governing the evaluation of findings of
scientific studies relating to the potential health risks associated with exposure to dioxin or
radiation. Id. at § 5(b)(1)(A). The Administrator is further directed to establish standards in
regulations to govern the use of the scientific studies and evaluations in the Administrator's
adjudication of individual claims. Id. at § 5(b)(1)(C).
By its Act, Congress is attempting to provide for the injured veterans and their families
through the VBA and the Veteran's Administration. However, the efficacy of this Congressional action in adequately compensating such injured parties remains to be seen.

